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CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS 
 








In this paper, we describe the nature of consumer behavior analysis, the development 
of a model of human consumer choice, and some of the research that it has inspired, 
and to draw some conclusions about the development of consumer behavior analysis. 
First, we describe the background thinking that inspired this work, notably by 
reference to the Behavioral Perspective Model as a device we have used to introduce 
behavior analytical thinking into the consumer domain, and also to some of the 
research endeavor that this has led to. We turn, finally, to the contents of this issue 
and their relationship to the ongoing consumer behavior analysis research program.  
 
 
THE NATURE OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS    
Consumer psychology is usually cognitive in orientation. Scores of consumer  
behavior texts assume this theoretical position without considering the philosophical 
implications of the concepts on which they rely to explain choice, let alone offering 
any philosophical justification for the cognitive stance itself. It is rare for the writers 
of these texts, as it is for consumer psychologists generally, to consider that an 
alternative paradigm, behavior analysis, can assist in the explanation of consumer 
choice. Yet there is a large volume of evidence to show that economic behavior is 
sensitive to environmental contingencies. Specifically, the subdiscipline of behavioral 
economics is concerned with the combination of experimental economics and operant 
psychology to elucidate economic relationships. Much of the work in behavioral 
economics has been concerned with nonhuman animals, though there is an increasing 
tendency to apply the methods developed in the operant chamber to a wide range of 
applied human problems. Consumer behavior analysis is the application of behavioral 
economics to the sphere of human consumer choice, particularly in the context of 
advanced marketing-oriented economies. Now, marketing brings a further level of 
complexity to what is already a multi-disciplinary exercise. There are considerations 
stemming from human marketing activity that are never encountered in the laboratory 
regardless of whether the subjects are human or nonhuman. The very concept of 
exchange, for instance, is either non-existent in the non-marketing environment or 
very much less complicated. Considerations of price, which are easily replicable in 
experiments, are compounded by those of advertising, distribution, and subtleties of 
product characteristics, as well as by issues of status consumption and interpersonal 
effects that are absent from behavioral economics work in non-marketing 
environments. It is the aim of consumer behavior analysis to comprehend marketing-
led consumer choice in terms of behavior analysis: to understand how far the methods 
of behavioral economics can be transferred from their original contexts to the 
marketing sphere, to recognize differences in human marketing behavior that require 
behavioral economics to be modified, to arrive at the boundaries of a behavior 
analytical interpretation of complex human behavior.  
 THE BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE MODEL     
The BPM is an elaboration of the three-term contingency, modified to take into 
account the complexities introduced by social and economic institutional 
arrangements that govern marketing activity. Consumer choice takes place at the 
intersection of the consumer’s learning history and the current consumer behavior 
setting, i.e., where the experience of consumption meets an opportunity to consume 
anew. This intersection of time and space forms the consumer situation, the 
immediate shaper of approach—avoidance responses involved in purchase and 
consumption. The consumer behavior setting is composed of the stimulus antecedents 
of that behavior, some of which will have been present on earlier consumption 
occasions. In the presence of the individual’s learning history, these initially neutral 
stimuli are transformed into the discriminative stimuli that set the occasion for current 
choice; in particular, his or her consumption history invests them with kind of 
meaning, i.e., the capacity to generate specific kinds of approach and or avoidance 
behaviors which produce consequences that regulate the rate of recurrence of the 
behaviors that produced them. The consumer situation consists also of motivating 
operations (MOs) such as rules that invest the consequences inherent in the 
discriminative stimuli with additional motivating or inhibitory power by making the 
consequences of radical behaviorism appear more or less reinforcing, more or less 
punishing. 
 
Like the three-term contingency, then, the BPM specifies behaviorally 
antecedent stimulus conditions (the behavior setting) but combines the concepts of 
discriminative stimuli and motivating operations by means of the construct of 
behavior setting scope, the extent to which these setting elements encourage or inhibit 
the behavior predicted to occur in such settings. Behavior setting scope is 
conceptualized as a continuum from closed to open in which the former type of 
setting permits one or at best a very few behaviors to be enacted within its confines, 
while the latter type permits a whole range of often competing behaviors to be 
enacted. 
 
The consequences of behavior fall into three types: utilitarian reinforcement 
which consists in the functional outcomes of behavior, informational reinforcement, 
which stems from the symbolic outcomes, principally performance feedback, and 
aversive/punishing consequences, the costs of purchase and consumption. Such 
aversive outcomes can themselves be subdivided into those that are utilitarian in 
nature and those that are symbolic. 
 
 In summary, then, we are looking at consumer behavior as a function of 
utilitarian reinforcement, informational reinforcement, and aversive consequences.  
 
 
Operant Classes of Consumer Behavior     
By combining high and low levels of utilitarian reinforcement and high and low levels 
of informational reinforcement, we can posit four operant classes of consumer 
behavior as shown in Figure xx. This figure represents at this stage no more than a 
hypothesis and the labels attached to the four classes of consumer behavior are purely 
arbitrary – though they have proved very useful in subsequent research.  
 
The four broad classes of consumer behavior which can be inferred from the pattern 
of high/low utilitarian and informational reinforcement that maintains them are as 
follows. 
 
Accomplishment is consumer behavior reflecting social and economic achievement: 
acquisition and conspicuous consumption of status goods, displaying products and 
services that signal personal attainment.  
 
Hedonism includes such activities as the consumption of popular entertainment.  
 
Accumulation includes the consumer behaviors involved in certain kinds of saving, 
collecting, and installment buying.  
 
Finally, Maintenance consists of activities necessary for the consumer’s physical 
survival and welfare (e.g. food) and the fulfillment of the minimal obligations entailed 
in membership of a social system (e.g. paying taxes).  
 
Note that both types of reinforcer figure in the maintenance of each of the four 
classes, though to differing extents. 
 
 
The BPM Contingency Matrix      
Adding in the scope of the current behavior setting, leads to the eightfold way 
depicted here which shows the variety of contingency categories that exclusively 
constitute a functional analysis of consumer behavior. Let us take a closer look at the 
four broad operant classes of consumer behavior with the added complexity of 
consumer behavior setting scope added in. 
 
Accomplishment 
 Accomplishment in an open setting consists in general in the purchase and 
consumption of status goods. A familiar instance is pre-purchase consumer behavior 
for luxuries and radical innovations such as exotic vacations and iPhones. These 
behaviors, including window-shopping and browsing, involve search for and 
comparative evaluation of information about many products and services. Most of the 
items in question are possessed and used for the pleasure or ease of living they confer, 
the wellbeing they make possible for the individual: they thereby provide extensive 
hedonic rewards. But they are often status symbols and their conspicuous 
consumption also strengthens the behavior in question. They attest directly, and often 
publicly and unambiguously, to the consumer's attainments, especially economic. 
Goods in this category are usually highly differentiated — by novel function in the 
case of innovations, by branding in the case of luxuries. 
 In a closed setting, Accomplishment can be generally described as fulfillment. 
In such a context, it comprises personal attainments gained through leisure, often with 
a strong element of recreation or excitement as well as achievement. This category 
refers to the material contribution to fulfillment and could include both the completion 
of a personal development seminar such as Insight and gambling in a casino. 
Gambling in so closed a setting is an activity maintained by both hedonic and 
informational consequences. In addition, few consumer behaviors are maintained so 
thoroughly by social rules. All these elements of the setting unambiguously signal 
both the positive consequences of approved approach behaviors and the potentially 
punishing implications of escape or avoidance responses which flout established rules 
and gaming conventions. Although several games may be available in the casino, 
there is one principal reinforcer: winning. Pleasure and social approval stem mainly 
from success, though a certain amount of enjoyment and prestige may be derived 
from being part of a somewhat exclusive social group and conforming to its code of 
behavior. Closely defined acts must be performed in order to participate, including 
obtaining membership, dressing appropriately, entering the game at the right time and 
in an acceptable manner. 
 
Hedonism 
 In an open setting, this behavior generally consists of popular entertainment. 
Obvious examples are watching television game shows which provide near-constant 
hedonic reward, and the reading of mass fiction which contains a sensation on almost 
every page. iPods and DVDs have made such reinforcement more immediate to the 
point of its being ubiquitous. Mass culture presents frequent and predictable, 
relatively strong and continuous hedonic rewards which are not contingent on long 
periods of concentrated effort. Indeed, the arrangement of reinforcers is such that 
viewing, listening or reading for even a short interval is likely to be rewarded. 
Informational feedback is more obvious on some occasions than others, as when game 
shows allow the audience to pit their own performances against that of the competing 
participants, but it is not the main source of reward. 
 Hedonism in closed settings consists as a generalization of inescapable 
entertainment and amelioration. The behaviors in question are potentially pleasurable 
but — in this context — may be irksome because they are unavoidable. As a result, 
consumption of these products and services may be passive rather than active. An 
example is the situation in which long distance airline passengers must purchase 
meals and movies along with their travel. The meals are usually consumed, like the 
in-flight movies which follow them, without alternative. The setting, which cannot be 
other than highly restrictive if one is to arrive safely, is further closed by the pulling 
of blinds, the disappearance of cabin staff, the impossibility of moving around the 
plane, and the attention of one's fellow passengers to the movie. To try to read or 
engage in other activities may even invite censure. 
 
Accumulation 
 In an open setting, Accumulation is generally described as saving and 
collecting. For example, purchases for which payments are made prior to 
consumption -- installments for a holiday which can only be taken once the full 
amount has been paid. Another example is payments into a Christmas club. 
Discretionary saving with the intention of making a large purchase once a certain 
amount has accumulated, would fall into this category, too. Promotional deals 
requiring the accumulation of coupons or other tokens before a product or service can 
be obtained also belong here. The important reward, in every case, is informational, 
feedback on how much one has accumulated, how close one is to the ultimate 
reinforcer. 
 Accumulation occurring in a closed setting may be described, in general 
terms, as token-based buying. This also involves collecting — through schemes in 
which payment for one item provides tokens which will pay for another. Although 
some examples of this are quite recent, the practice is simply an extension of the 
familiar prize schemes open to collectors of cigarette cards or trading stamps. For 
example, the ―air-miles‖ earned by frequent flyers on domestic and international 
airlines constitute informational reinforcers (Foxall, 1997b). Some hotels also offer 
gifts to customers who accumulate points by staying there frequently. The collection 
of these tokens is reinforced by gaining additional free air travel or hospitality, or by 
access to different types of reinforcer such as prizes. Purchase and consumption of the 
basic product, the air travel or accommodation originally demanded are maintained by 
both the intrinsic hedonic rewards they embody and the feedback on progress that is 
being made toward the ultimate incentive. The setting is relatively closed because the 
first item would probably be purchased anyway in some form or other and the 
consumer's income constraint makes it likely that the second or backup reinforcer 
would be obtained only in this way. 
 
Maintenance 
 In an open setting, Maintenance may be generally described as routine 
purchasing and consumption. This includes the regular buying of goods necessary for 
survival. For example, the habitual purchasing of grocery items at a supermarket. 
Consumer behavior in these circumstances is indeed routine: it occurs as if 
reinforcement were available only at fixed intervals. Further, contrary to the usual 
depiction, the frequent consumer of , say, baked beans is highly rational, having tried 
and evaluated many brands in the relevant product class. But his or her behavior is not 
static: again in contrast to the received wisdom of the marketing texts, comparatively 
few such consumers are brand loyal in the sense of always choosing the identical 
brand in a long sequence of shopping trips. There is so much choice that the consumer 
enjoys considerable discretion among versions of the product (Ehrenberg, 
1988/1972). 
 Maintenance is generally characterized in closed settings as mandatory 
purchase and consumption. It includes all forms of consumer behavior necessary to 
remain a citizen: the payment of taxes for public and collective goods, for instance; 
less extremely, it includes payments into pension schemes linked to employment, 
payments of endowment insurance premiums linked to mortgages. To this extent, 
Maintenance is the consumer behavior inherent in pursuing the normal business of 
citizenship. In the workplace, it may include the enforced use of areas under smoking 
bans which, for smokers, represent a severe limitation on behavior (though for 
nonsmokers, particularly the allergic, they constitute an opening of the setting, a 
measure that permits a wider range of behaviors). 
 
 
RESEARCH         
 
Three strands of research exemplify the attempt to test the model: the prediction of 
verbal behavior with respect to consumers’ emotional responses to retail and 
consumption environments, the application of matching and maximization techniques 
to consumer choice, and the analysis of consumer demand. We are also developing 
experimental work and a methodology of case study, but I will concentrate here on 
the first three. 
 
Verbal behavior and emotional response     
The first aim was to test the model as a whole, to understand whether (and if so how) 
the three structural variables of setting scope, utilitarian reinforcement and 
informational reinforcement interacted. The first study, undertaken in England, 
employed A tripartite classification of verbal responses to the emotions engendered 
by different environments, based on Mehrabian and Russell’s theory of environmental 
psychology. The three dominant emotions are pleasure, arousal, and dominance. The 
verbal measures of these emotions were interpreted as predictable in various 
consumer contexts defined by the BPM. Utilitarian reinforcement was proposed as 
engendering the verbal responses that Mehrabian and Russell proposed to measure 
pleasure which implied satisfaction and utility. Informational reinforcement, the 
verbal responses related to arousal which emphasize environmental feedback and the 
monitoring of changing circumstances. The scope of the consumer behavior setting 
was assumed to correspond to the verbalizations that M&R linked to dominance 
(being in control as opposed to being subject to another).  
 
This is not the kind of research framework that experimental behavior analysis would 
enjoin upon us, but it seems particularly appropriate for the testing of what is 
essentially an interpretive device for understanding complex human behavior rather 
than an experimental technique for use in the closed settings of the operant laboratory. 
 
Both the predictions and the results of this work are shown here. The expectations of a 
larger pleasure score for higher utilitarian reinforcement, denoted by an uppercase as 
opposed to a lower case P was borne out. Similarly a larger arousal score was found 
for greater informational reinforcement (denoted by A), and a larger dominance score 
characterized a more open consumer behavior setting scope (D).  
 
The results indicate that by using P, A and D, as predicted verbal responses to the 
consumer situations defined by the BPM contingency matrix, it is possible to make 
useful predictions of consumer behavior. This work has been replicated in Venezuela, 
in Spanish, with similar results.  
 
 
Matching and maximization 
We turn now to a research area much closer to the heart of behavioral economics. An 
important debate in the evolution of behavioral economics has been – and to some 
extent remains – the question whether consumers maximize in some sense or follow 
some other decision rule such as satisficing. Controversy has long surrounded 
economists’ assumption that consumer behaviour maximizes utility (or the satisfactions 
obtained from owning and using economic products and services).  
Failure to generate definitive experimental data has not deterred these behavioral 
scientists from suggesting, in the absence of any direct evidence, how the behaviour of 
human consumers is related to the system of rewards that ostensibly maintains it. The 
application has, however, devised and tested a method of obtaining data on consumers' 
purchase choices over time which have direct relevance to our understanding more 
clearly how consumer choice is distributed over a sequence of purchase occasions, and 
when such behaviour can be said to maximize.  
 
Matching refers to the tendency of animals and humans to distribute their 
responses between two choices in proportion to the patterns of reward programmed to be 
contingent on each choice. Herrnstein discovered, defined and built upon this 
phenomenon. Defining choice not as an internal deliberative process but as a rate of 
intersubjectively observable events that are temporally distributed, Herrnstein’s 
dependent variable was not the single response that needed contextual explication in 
terms of a single contingent reinforcer: it was the relative frequency of responding, 
which he explained by reference to the relative rate of reinforcement obtained from 
the behavior.  
 
Most choices for human consumers require the allocation of a fixed income between 
alternative choices, each of which exacts a different monetary sacrifice. In this case, 
responses take the form of surrendering money in varying amounts, while the reward is 
the receipt of a fixed amount of the good in question. Price is the ratio of units of money 
that must be exchanged for units of the good. Both matching and maximizing theories 
make a similar prediction of behaviour on such schedules: the individual will maximize 
by exclusively selecting the schedule that provides the higher return. Studies of animal 
choice confirm this prediction. 
 
 Matching, then, is the tendency of individual organisms to allocate responses 
among alternatives in proportion to the reinforcement obtained from each. The 
matching relationship is represented by the Generalized Matching Law (Baum, 1974): 
 
log (B1/B2) = s log (R1/R2) + log  b                                              (1) 
where B1 and B2 are the allocations of behavior to choices 1 and 2 respectively, R1 
and R2 are the rates of reinforcement derived from choices 1 and 2 respectively, b is a 
measure of bias in favor of either B1 or B2 that stems from factors other than the 
schedules of reinforcement in operation, and s is the sensitivity of the behavior ratio 
(B1/B2) to the reinforcement ratio (R1/R2).  
 The parameter log b or bias constitutes the intercept of the linear log-log 
formulation of the law. Deviations of this parameter from unity are interpreted as 
indicating a consistent preference for one option independently of its reinforcement 
rate schedule. Such bias is generally a result of experimental artifacts that could make 
one response less costly than the other. The exponent s constitutes the slope of the 
linear log-log formulation, and corresponds to a deviation from ideal matching (s = 1), 
indicating that the individual favors the richer (s>1, overmatching) or the poorer (s<1, 
undermatching) schedule of reinforcement more than predicted by the matching law. 
Furthermore, research using matching analysis with qualitatively different reinforcers 
(e.g. food and water) has shown to be an exception to the predictions of matching law. 
When using qualitatively different commodities, as gross complements (i.e. when an 
increase on the consumption of one product requires the increase of the consumption 
of a second product, as is the case with food and water), it has been found that choice 
ratio has an inverse relationship with the reinforcement ratio, showing the exact 
opposite of what the matching law predicts. Hence, this particular effect has been 
named antimatching, and in operational terms it consists of a result of s<0 in the 
generalized matching equation. 
On the assumption that s is a measure of the substitutability of the choice 
alternatives available, under- or over-matching and anti-matching presumably indicate 
some level of the independence or complementarity of these options. Another 
assumption of our empirical work was that the price structures faced by consumers 
resemble the ratio schedules. As predicted in the case of behavior on such schedules, 
consumers should both match and maximize by always selecting the most favorable 
option, the cheapest alternative. By and large, our analyses found both patterns: brand 
competition was generally marked by ideal matching, while product choices, as 
demonstrated here by wine and cola purchases by some degree of under-, over- or 
anti-matching. Relative demand curves were generally down-ward sloping. Again 
with some exceptions, consumers maximized by purchasing the least expensive of the 
brands composing their considerations sets – shown here by their consistently 
selecting to the right of the midpoint.  
 
 Where there were exceptions from the predictions of matching and 
maximizing theories, they occurred for reasons peculiar to the marketing context: 
first, because the composition of consumers’ consideration sets often meant that their 
selections were among premium priced, higher quality brands, or at least those more 
highly differentiated through promotional activity, rather than among all of the brands 
that made up the product category. As a result, their selecting the least expensive 
brand refers only to their choosing within the limitations of this subset of available 
product versions. A second source of exception was that some consumers bought 
more than one brand on a single shopping trip, often adding a rather more expensive 
brand to the cheapest within their consideration set. No doubt the different brands 
were intended for distinct situations of usage, as when a standard and less expensive 
fruit juice is purchased for consumption by children of the household in the course of 
the day and a more expensive version is obtained for the family’s use at breakfast. 
The sheer desire for variety sometimes led consumers to select a more expensive 
brand on occasion, either in addition to or instead of the cheapest alternative. In the 
qualitative phase of the research one respondent reported that she ―just had to‖ buy a 
distinctively-flavored brand of butter from time to time; another, that she would 
purchase a cheaper store brand sometimes even though this was not part of her regular 
repertoire simply as a result of the convenience of shopping at a different 
supermarket. But, apart from these predictable exceptions, the predictions of both 
matching and maximization theories were fulfilled. Although matching is a truism in 
the case of consumer choice – the more one buys, the more one spends, and at more 
or less constant prices the relative amount spent on one brand will be proportionally 
similar to the relative amount of it that is bought – these studies have clarified a 
number of matters in marketing and consumer research.       
 
 
Consumer demand analysis 
 
Much of the work on demand analysis has involved comparison of the buying 
patterns of consumers grouped by their predominant purchasing of brands having 
specific patterns of informational and utilitarian reinforcement. Hence, consumers 
were classified in one of six groups, derived from the combination of the three levels 
of informational and the two levels of utilitarian reinforcement, on the basis of the 
informational-utilitarian level of the brands they bought more frequently. The six 
groups were named as follows: Group 1 - Informational Level 1 and Utilitarian Level 
1; Group 2 - Informational Level 1 and Utilitarian Level 2; Group 3 – Informational 
Level 2 and Utilitarian Level 1; Group 4 – Informational Level 2 and Utilitarian Level 
2; Group 5 – Informational Level 3 and Utilitarian Level 1; and Group 6 – 
Informational Level 3 and Utilitarian Level 2.  
Groups’ buying patterns were compared in terms of elasticity of demand, 
using the equation         
 
 
Log Quantity = a - b (Log Price)      (2) 
as suggested by Kagel et al. (1995). 
 
           
All regressions, using the above equation (calculated with relative measures of 
quantity and price), were statistically significant (i.e., p < .000 for all groups). The 
values of R
2
 were not very large and ranged from .22 to .46, indicating that other 
variables that did not enter the equation also influenced the quantities consumers 
bought. The values of standard error were all ten or more times smaller than the 
corresponding coefficients of price elasticity, b, suggesting accurate estimations of the 
latter. All price elasticity coefficients were negative indicating that the quantity 
consumers bought tended to decrease with increases in price. Moreover, all 
coefficient values were between zero and –1.0, indicating that demand was inelastic 
for all consumer groups. Despite these similarities, the absolute values of elasticity 
coefficients were lower for the extreme groups, Groups 1 and 6, than for the other 
groups, suggesting that consumers that buy predominantly intermediate-level brands 
showed higher price responsiveness than those buying predominantly the least- and 
highest-differentiated brands (split-sample reliability analyses confirm this trend).  
 
Intra- and inter-brand elasticities 
The observed decreases in the quantity bought with increases in prices, 
indicated by negative elasticity coefficients, may, however, have been associated with 
different response patterns by different groups. The tendency to buy larger quantities 
when prices are lower may be related to one or more of the following three patterns:  
 
1) buying larger quantities of a product when its price was below its usual, 
average, price rather than when its price was above its average price (i.e., intra-brand 
or absolute elasticity); 2) buying larger quantities when buying brands belonging to 
cheaper, lower informational levels than when buying brands belonging to more 
expensive, higher informational levels (i.e., informational inter-brand or relative 
elasticity); and 3) buying larger quantities when buying brands belonging to cheaper, 
lower utilitarian levels than when buying brands belonging to more expensive, higher 
utilitarian levels (i.e., utilitarian inter-brand or relative elasticity).  
 
One way of measuring such patterns is to decompose the global price elasticity 
coefficient into three different coefficients, namely, intra-brand, informational inter-
brand, and utilitarian inter-brand coefficients. This analysis would yield an equation 
in which the quantity bought would be a function of intra-brand changes in price, 
informational reinforcement levels of the purchased brands, and the utilitarian 
reinforcement levels of the purchased brands, that is,  
 
Log Quantity = a – b1 (Log Intra-Brand Price) – b2 (Log Informational  
Level) – b3 (Log Utilitarian Level).    (3) 
 
All regressions were statistically significant (i.e., p < .000 for all groups). The 
values of R
2
 were not very large and ranged from .06 to .36, indicating that other 
variables that did not enter the equation also influenced the quantities consumers 
bought. Only three, out of 18, values of standard error were ten or more times smaller 
than the corresponding coefficients of price elasticity, b, suggesting that coefficient 
estimations were not very accurate (although split-sample reliability analyses 
corroborated the observed patterns). Collinearity analyses yielded values of tolerance 
and VIF close to 1.00, suggesting that there was no significant covariance among 
variables included in the equation. All price elasticity coefficients were negative 
indicating that the quantity consumers bought tended to decrease with increases in 
intra-brand price variations, informational level and utilitarian level. Moreover, with 
the exception of the intra-brand coefficient for Group 2 (-1.51), all coefficient values 
were between zero and –1.0, indicating that all three types of demand tended to be 
inelastic for all consumer groups. Despite such similarities, the absolute values of 
intra-brand, informational inter-brand, and utilitarian inter-brand elasticity 
coefficients differed across consumer groups, as shown in here: 
 
Intra-brand elasticity coefficients were lower for Groups 1 and 6 than for the 
intermediate groups, showing a decreasing trend from Group 2 to Group 6. This 
suggests that consumers buying predominantly the cheapest, least-differentiated 
brands (i.e., Group 1) do not change much the quantity they buy as a function of 
changes in brand price relative to their usual (average) price. This result suggests a 
tendency of buying the cheapest brands, irrespective of other, a little more expensive, 
brands. If this interpretation is correct, the observed pattern for intra-brand elasticity, 
which was largest for Group 2 and decreased systematically as group classification 
increased up to Group 6, can be interpreted as suggesting that responsiveness to intra-
brand changes in price decreases as group classification increases. In other words, if 
the low intra-brand elasticity observed for Group 1 is a consequence of buying the 
cheapest brands most of the time, these findings point to the conclusion that as the 
level of differentiation of the purchased brands increases (i.e., as the price of 
purchased brands increases), the responsiveness of consumers to changes in prices 
decreases.  
Informational inter-brand elasticities were smaller than intra-brand elasticities 
for all six groups and followed a similar pattern, with Group 1 showing a low 
coefficient, Group 2 showing the largest one which decreases systematically with 
increases in group classification up to Group 6. This suggests that consumers buying 
mostly the least-differentiated, cheapest brands do not change much the quantities 
they buy as a function of informational brand level, whereas the responsiveness to 
informational reinforcement of those buying intermediate-level brands decreases 
systematically with increases in the informational level of the predominantly 
purchased brands. This value is close to zero for Group 6, suggesting that consumers 
that already usually buy the highest informational and utilitarian level brands are not 
sensitive to changes in informational level (similar to a ―satiation‖ effect, since 
satiated animals are not expected to be responsive to food, i.e., to do things to get 
food).  
Utilitarian inter-brand elasticity, indicated by the filled circles, was higher for 
the three groups that bought predominantly low utilitarian-level brands (i.e., Groups 
1, 3 and 5) than for the other three that bought high utilitarian-level brands. This 
finding indicates that consumers who buy predominantly brands with low utilitarian 
levels tend also to buy smaller quantities of higher utilitarian brands, whereas those 
that buy predominantly brands with high utilitarian levels do not seem to vary much 
the quantities they buy as a function of utilitarian brand level. Hence, the utilitarian 
inter-brand elasticities followed a slightly different pattern from the informational 
inter-brand elasticities, though like them they were mostly smaller than intra-brand 
elasticities. Group 1 is the only exception with a coefficient larger than that of the 
intra-brand elasticities, if only marginally. Whereas the other two curves follow a 
similar pattern, the shape of the utilitarian curve is different in that it follows a zigzag 
course with Group 2 showing a lower coefficient than Group 1 and 3, and similarly 
Group 4 and 6 displaying a lower coefficient than their neighbor groups. The 
implications of this pattern are more complicated because it suggests that consumers 
buying mostly at utilitarian level 1, i.e. Groups 1, 3 and 5, are more sensitive to 
changes in utilitarian level than consumers with a preference for utilitarian level 2, 
independent of the informational level of the brand. For example, consumers who 
mostly buy the least-differentiated, cheapest brands (i.e. Group 1) are more likely to 
buy larger quantities than consumers who buy at but a higher utilitarian but at the 
same informational level (i.e. Group 2). Consumers of Group 3 however, with a lower 
utilitarian level than Groups 2 and 4 but a higher informational level than Group 2 and 
the same informational level as Group 4, is in turn more responsive to utilitarian 
reinforcement than both Group 2 and 4.  
 
Combining Matching and Demand Analysis 
Finally we would like to mention, albeit briefly, some work that is in progress right 
now. The combination of matching analysis and elasticity of demand has led to the 
testing an equation that relates amount spent to quantity bought, utilitarian 
reinforcement obtained, informational reinforcement obtained, and price paid (which 
detects promotions).  
 
 The results for a single product so far – the humble but ubiquitous baked bean 
– indicate that the expected relationships between all these variables were found, and 
that – very reassuringly – the R2 value is high.  
 
 
